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OVERVIEW — Many reform proposals call for the creation 
of one or more health insurance exchanges, intermediaries 
that can help individuals or small employers navigate the 
insurance market. An exchange might be public or private, 
national or local. It might serve simply as a clearinghouse for 
plan information or could play an active role in setting ben-
efit packages, choosing high-quality plans, and negotiating 
premium rates. This paper begins with a summary of recent 
experience with insurance exchanges and similar systems. It 
then reviews basic issues in the design of an exchange.
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Faced with a persistently large number of Americans lacking health insurance (45 million in 2007), policy-
makers are once again focusing on making coverage more 
affordable and accessible. Although some favor new or ex-
panded public insurance programs, many proposals focus 
instead on providing tax credits or other subsidies that could 
help modest-income families or small-employer groups buy 
private insurance. A key problem for such proposals is that 
many people face nonfinancial barriers to obtaining cover-
age, especially in the individual or nongroup market. 
In most states, insurers can refuse or restrict coverage for applicants 
with a history of medical problems or high costs, or they can charge 
these applicants higher premiums that could make coverage unaf-
fordable, even with a subsidy. Insurers may compete on their ability 
to select the healthiest enrollees, rather than on efficiency or quality. 
Even healthy consumers may have difficulty choosing from among 
a large variety of plans with confusing differences in benefit pack-
ages and coverage rules. Finally, multiple insurers selling coverage 
directly to individuals and small groups have high marketing and 
other administrative costs.
For at least two decades, analysts have been proposing that some sort 
of government agency or independent entity should stand between 
insurance companies and insurance purchasers. The intermediary 
has had a variety of names over the years, such as “health alliance,” 
“purchasing cooperative,” and “connector.” This paper will use the 
phrase “health insurance exchange,” but the basic concept of an in-
termediary is more or less the same, regardless of the terminology. 
An exchange might serve simply as a clearinghouse, informing indi-
viduals and/or employers of the health plan choices available to them 
and presenting standardized comparative information on benefits, 
premium rates, and perhaps quality and consumer satisfaction. In 
many proposals, however, an exchange would be more proactive. It 
would contract with some number of competing health plans, selected 
on the basis of price, quality, and other factors. It would set rules for 
participating insurers’ underwriting and rating practices and would 
negotiate benefit packages (or it might enforce requirements set by 
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legislation or by a regulatory agency). Finally, it would manage enroll-
ment and premium payment processes. 
Proponents of this approach contend that an exchange could, at a 
minimum, simplify the process of finding and enrolling in a health 
plan and could promote greater competition by offering consumers 
a clear menu of plan choices. Some also suggest that an exchange 
could achieve economies of scale in administrative costs and, if it 
served a large population, might have enough bargaining power to 
negotiate lower premiums. 
PROTOT YPES
Purchasing Cooperatives
There has long been interest in finding some way of giving smaller 
employers and individuals the purchasing power of large-employer 
groups. Specific trade or professional groups, such as the American 
Bar Association, have offered coverage to their members through 
contracts with health insurers. Other groups serve small employers 
across multiple industries. For example, the Council of Smaller En-
terprises (COSE) in Cleveland, Ohio, has been offering health cover-
age since 1973. Currently, it serves 11,000 firms with 150,000 covered 
employees.1 A similar private initiative is the Health Connections 
program of the Connecticut Business and Industry Association 
(CBIA), which has operated since 1995 and, in 2007, served 88,000 
members in almost 5,800 companies.2 
COSE offers a wide variety of plan designs, including a health main-
tenance organization (HMO), preferred provider organizations 
(PPOs), and high-deductible plans with a health savings account 
(HSA). However, since all the plans have always been provided 
by a single health insurer, Medical Mutual of Ohio (formerly Blue 
Cross), COSE is more like a portal to that insurer than a purchaser. 
The choice of plans is made by the employer; a firm has the option 
of making up to three plans available to its employees. CBIA offers 
fewer different plan designs, but multiple insurers offer each type 
of plan. In addition, each employee chooses from among all the 
available plans. The CBIA system thus comes much closer to the 
model contemplated by advocates of “managed competition,” in 
which insurers compete to attract individual enrollees on the basis 
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of price and/or quality. However, CBIA is not exactly a purchaser, 
either. The participating plans offer the same rates that they offer to 
small employers purchasing outside the CBIA arrangement.
During the 1990s, a number of states promoted similar health insur-
ance purchasing cooperatives (HIPCs) for small employers. Some 
were managed directly by government agencies, while others were 
independent entities authorized by state legislation. Although these 
programs enjoyed some initial successes—the largest, the Health 
Insurance Plan of California, served 7,430 groups with more than 
140,000 enrollees in 1998—most have since failed.3 Their enrollment 
was a tiny fraction of the market, insufficient to attract insurers or 
give them much negotiating power. One analysis of the three larg-
est HIPCs found that they did not increase small-group enrollment 
in their states and did not reduce premiums.4 In other cases, insur-
ers competing outside the cooperative “cherry-picked” the healthiest 
groups, leaving the cooperatives with deteriorating pools of high-cost 
groups.5 (PacAdvantage, the successor to the California HIPC, tried to 
address this problem in its final years by charging higher premiums 
to high-risk groups, as its outside competitors did. However, this mea-
sure was taken too late to prevent the pool from collapsing.)6
Massachuset ts Connector
The Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority was es-
tablished as part of the state’s sweeping 2006 health reform law, 
which included a mandate that nearly all individuals obtain health 
insurance coverage and that employers with 11 or more workers pro-
vide coverage or pay an assessment to the state. The Connector oper-
ates two separate insurance exchanges. 
Commonwealth Care (CommCare) is a subsidized program offering 
for people with incomes below 300 percent of the federal poverty 
level (FPL)who do not have access to employer-sponsored coverage. 
Participants are assigned to a coverage level based on income. Those 
with incomes below 100 percent of the FPL have copayments only for 
prescription drugs and receive a dental benefit. Higher-income en-
rollees have copayments for all services, rising with income, and no 
dental coverage. Premium contributions are required for enrollees 
with incomes above 150 percent of the FPL. Within each coverage cat-
egory, enrollees have a choice among four different carriers. Except 
for the lowest-income group, enrollees choosing a more costly carrier 
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pay half of the difference between their carrier’s premium and that 
of the lowest-cost carrier. In its first years, CommCare was required 
to contract with the four organizations al-
ready serving the Medicaid (MassHealth) 
population. This gave the program limited 
bargaining power.7 For the year beginning 
July 2009, the program has been opened to 
additional bidders, and bidding has been 
more competitive. Although premiums rose 
9.4 percent between 2008 and 2009, those for 
the coming year have actually dropped slightly, and a fifth plan will 
be participating.8
Commonwealth Choice (CommChoice) is an unsubsidized pro-
gram offering a choice of six carriers and three benefit levels, Gold, 
Silver, and Bronze (plus special limited coverage plans for young 
adults), to people with incomes above the  CommCare level. The 
three benefit levels are defined in terms of approximate actuarial 
value. Available plans within a level may have different specific 
benefits—some have a deductible, while others charge only copay-
ments—and more or less restrictive provider networks. 
Although people eligible for CommCare must enroll through the 
Connector, higher-income people can choose to enroll through 
CommChoice or buy non-exchange coverage on their own. The car-
riers who offer plans through the Connector offer the same plans 
at the same premium rates outside the Connector.9 (They may also 
offer different benefit designs to non-Connector enrollees, and some 
other carriers sell individual and small-group coverage entirely 
outside the Connector.) Although the Connector functions more as 
a clearinghouse than as a purchaser, its authority to confer a seal of 
approval gives it some leverage in negotiating premiums and ben-
efits. For the year beginning July 2008, average premium increases 
were 5.1 percent. (In comparison, large employers nationally report-
ed an average increase of 6.0 percent for 2008.)10
Public Employer Plans
Large-employer group health plans frequently offer participants a 
choice from among multiple competing plans and perform many 
of the negotiating and coordinating functions envisioned for an ex-
Commonwealth Choice is an unsubsidized program 
offering a choice of six carriers and three benefit levels, 
plus special limited coverage plans for young adults, 
to people with incomes above 300 percent of the FPL
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change. In particular, two plans operated by public employers have 
often been suggested as models for a competitive system. 
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) — The FEHBP, admin-
istered by the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM), may 
be the most widely cited example of an exchange-like system. Out-
side of Medicare, the FEHBP is the largest single purchaser of health 
insurance benefits in the United States, covering over 8 million fed-
eral employees, annuitants, and dependents.
FEHBP participants choose from among four different types of or-
ganizations: a Blue Cross/Blue Shield PPO plan, PPOs offered by 
employee organizations, HMOs, and high-deductible or consumer-
directed health plans, which provide coverage in 
conjunction with a spending or savings account. 
(Many of these organizations offer two benefit 
levels, such as a “standard” and a “basic” plan.) 
Most of the PPOs operate nationally, while HMOs 
and the consumer-directed plans serve insurer-
defined service areas. Each plan defines its own 
benefit package, subject to negotiation with OPM; OPM has not pre-
scribed a minimum benefit package.
Premium rates are set in two ways. The PPOs and some HMOs 
are experience-rated; premiums reflect actual expected costs for 
FEHBP enrollees, with a small profit allowance. Most HMOs are 
community-rated; they charge the FEHBP the same rates as other 
similar-sized large groups, with adjustments for population differ-
ences. For both employees and annuitants, the program makes a 
fixed contribution to plan premiums. This is set at the lesser of (i) 
72 percent of the average premium for all plans, weighted by en-
rollment, or (ii) 75 percent of the premium.11 Participants pay the 
remainder through payroll or annuity deduction. OPM sets aside 3 
percent of all premium amounts paid to establish plan-specific re-
serve funds. These can be used in later years to cover losses, prevent 
sharp premium increases, or avoid benefit cuts. OPM negotiates pre-
miums to some extent. It can question the actuarial assumptions 
used by a plan in developing its rate proposal, can ask for benefit 
changes to limit premium growth, and can agree with the plan on 
the extent to which the reserve funds will be built up or drawn 
down during the year. 
Outside of Medicare, the FEHBP is the largest 
single purchaser of health insurance benefits in 
the United States.
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OPM spent $27 million, less than one-tenth of 1 percent of total 
 FEHBP spending, to administer the program in 2007.12 However, 
OPM only negotiates and oversees carrier contracts and directly pro-
cesses enrollment transactions for federal annuitants. The other func-
tions of a large employer, such as processing new enrollments and 
enrollment changes and collecting and transmitting employee and 
employer premium contributions, are performed by the employing 
agencies. Costs for personnel operations are included in each agency’s 
budget.13 In addition to direct OPM and agency expenses, administra-
tive costs for each participating carrier (such as for claims process-
ing and care management) are included in that carrier’s premiums. 
OPM estimated in 2003 that Blue Cross and the other national plans 
spent about 7 percent of premiums on administration.14 This is slightly 
lower than the 8.6 percent administrative costs as a percent of pre-
mium equivalents reported by Blue Cross plans serving self-insured 
employers in 2006.15 Administrative costs for the FEHBP HMOs are 
not publicly available but are likely to vary widely.
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) — CalPERS is an-
other commonly cited model of an exchange-like system. It admin-
isters health benefits for 1.3 million workers and retir-
ees, including state employees and those of 1,100 local 
agencies that have chosen to participate.16 CalPERS 
offers a choice among several contracting HMOs, all 
offering standard benefits, and two self-insured PPO 
options. An independent board negotiates benefits 
and premium rates. (The State of Wisconsin Group Health Insur-
ance Program operates in much the same way, negotiating premi-
ums with multiple plans for a standardized package and providing 
optional coverage to local governments.)17
An important difference between the FEHBP and CalPERS is that the 
FEHBP serves only a “captive” population. Participants are unlikely 
to seek coverage in the outside market, because they would have to 
forgo the government premium contribution. CalPERS, on the other 
hand, faces some degree of competition, because local governments 
can choose to use CalPERS or find coverage in the group market. 
(One result is that CalPERS has been compelled to negotiate separate 
premium rates for different regions, because uniform statewide rates 
were noncompetitive in some areas, and groups were drifting away.)
Like other large-employer plans, the FEHBP and CalPERS experi-
enced high premium growth in the early years of this decade and 
CalPERS administers health benefits for 
1.3 million workers and retirees.
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slower growth more recently. As Fig-
ure 1 shows, the FEHBP has done 
slightly better than other large em-
ployers. During the ten years from 
1999 to 2008, FEHBP average premi-
ums rose 8.0 percent per year; those 
of other large employers, 8.7 percent. 
The comparison for some years may 
be slightly misleading, because OPM 
has periodically drawn on reserve 
funds to hold down premium increas-
es. CalPERS had a spike in premiums 
early in this decade and responded 
by increasing cost-sharing and drop-
ping some high-priced plans.18 If the 
24 percent increase in 2003 were omit-
ted, CalPERS average increases over 
the ten years would be about the same 
as for other large employers. 
One factor in recent FEHBP experi-
ence is worth noting in the context 
of the exchange concept. FEHBP en-
rollees have been moving from more 
costly to less costly plans. If all FEHBP 
enrollees in 2002 had stayed in the 
same plan through 2007, premium increases over the five-year pe-
riod would have averaged 8.9 percent a year. Enrollee shifts reduced 
this figure to 7.7 percent a year, suggesting that plan competition in 
a structured arrangement can make some difference.19 Whether the 
shift has been to more efficient plans or to plans with less extensive 
benefits is unclear. However, analysis by the Government Account-
ability Office indicates that, for enrollees staying within the same 
plans, benefit reductions have reduced premium growth.20 Similar 
trends have also occurred in other large-employer plans. 
Medicare Advantage
Under the Medicare Advantage (MA) program, Medicare beneficia-
ries may choose between original Medicare (the basic fee-for-service 
program) and various types of private plans, including HMOs, 
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Note: CalPERS figures are for active workers only. FEHBP figures include annuitants, as may 
some of the figures reported by large employers in the Kaiser/HRET surveys.
Source: For FEHBP and CalPERS, 1999-2007: U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Premiums Continue to Rise, but Rate of Growth 
Has Recently Slowed, GAO-07-873T, Washington, DC, May 2007;  For FEHBP, 2008: Office of 
Personnel Management, “OPM Holds Average FEHB Premium Increase to about Two Percent for 
Second Year,” press release, September, 13, 2007; For CalPERS, 2008: Facts at a Glance: Health, 
2008; For large employers: Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust 
(Kaiser/HRET), Employer Health Benefits: Annual Survey, 1999–2008.
FIGURE 1:  Annual Percent Growth in Premiums for FEHBP, 
CalPERS, and Large Employers (200+ workers), 1999–2008
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PPOs, and private fee-for-service plans. Nearly 10 million beneficia-
ries—over one-fifth of the Medicare population—were enrolled in 
MA plans as of November 2008.21 MA plans usually provide better 
benefits than the original Medicare program at a lower cost to bene-
ficiaries than other sources of supplemental coverage, such as the in-
dividual Medigap policies sold by private insurers. However, many 
plans are able to finance these extra benefits only because Medicare 
is paying them much more than it would have spent to cover the 
same beneficiaries on a fee-for-service basis. Because of the payment 
issues, discussions of competitive models rarely allude to the MA 
program. Still, some features of the program’s operations may shed 
light on design decisions for exchange programs.
DESIGN ISSUES
Different health reform proposals call for an exchange operating at 
the state, regional, or national level. Some would have the exchange 
operated directly by a government agency, such as OPM at the fed-
eral level or some state agency, while others contemplate some in-
dependent organization that might possibly receive public funding 
but be insulated to some extent from the political process. These 
choices are key to designing an exchange and will be considered 
at the end of this section. Regardless of an exchange’s geograph-
ic scope or organizational structure, however, some basic issues 
would need to be addressed. 
Eligibilit y
An exchange could be open to all individuals, to all small-employer 
groups, and/or to specific populations, such as self-employed indi-
viduals or early retirees. All of the HIPCs were designed to serve 
small employers. In contrast, the Massachusetts Connector enrolls 
individuals, although some may pay their premiums with pretax 
dollars set aside by their employers through a section 125, “cafeteria 
plan” arrangement. (The Connector now has a pilot program under 
which small employers may contract with the Connector directly.)
Perhaps the key issue in setting eligibility rules is the extent to 
which the exchange would replace or compete with existing sources 
of coverage. Under some proposals, the exchange is intended to be 
the main route to coverage for its target population. This approach 
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would maximize the exchange’s ability to negotiate premiums, 
structure the market, and influence the performance of the health 
care system. More commonly, proponents of an exchange assume 
that it would operate within the existing market. So, for example, an 
exchange offering a choice of insurance plans to individuals would 
compete with non-exchange plans selling coverage to the same tar-
get population. 
An exchange operating in this way would need to balance two dif-
ferent concerns. On the one hand, it would need to attract a large and 
diverse population to encourage insurer participation and to avoid 
becoming the coverage source of last resort, serving only people 
who could not find coverage on more favorable terms elsewhere. On 
the other hand, if the exchange were to prove highly competitive be-
cause of lower administrative costs or other advantages, there might 
be calls to narrow its target population in order to minimize disrup-
tion of the existing market or to prevent the exchange from gaining 
too much market power. 
There are a number of options for restricting access to an exchange. 
An exchange serving individuals could be closed to people who have 
access to an employer group plan. This would require some way of 
verifying current or past coverage or access to coverage. Another 
way of narrowing enrollment would be to make the exchange avail-
able only to people who qualified for a tax credit or other subsidy. 
This would minimize disruption of the private nongroup market, 
because current buyers of nongroup coverage tend to have higher 
incomes than the uninsured and would be less likely to qualify for 
subsidies.22 Although this approach would be satisfying to nongroup 
carriers, it could also mean that higher-income people with health 
problems, who might have difficulty obtaining nongroup coverage 
today, might still be left without access to coverage.
Most proposals for an exchange serving employers have some upper 
limit on firm size, such as 50 or 100 workers. One reason is a per-
ception that larger groups have no difficulty obtaining coverage in 
the existing market. But there is another possible reason for exclud-
ing them: large-employer groups tend to pay lower premiums than 
small groups for comparable coverage, because of smaller admin-
istrative costs. It is uncertain that an exchange could reduce these 
costs enough to be attractive to most large employers. If not, the only 
large employers that would seek coverage through the exchange 
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might tend to be those with higher-cost enrollees, thereby driving 
up average costs for the whole pool.
Competition with Carriers Outside the Exchange
Nongroup insurers in most states are allowed to refuse coverage to 
high-risk individuals, limit coverage for any “preexisting condition” 
the purchaser has at the time coverage takes effect, and charge high-
er premium rates to older purchasers or those with a history of high 
costs or medical problems. Federal law prohibits small-group insur-
ers from excluding any firm or employee within a firm but leaves 
rate regulation to states; many states allow higher rates for high-risk 
groups. (For a fuller discussion of this issue, see the NHPF back-
ground paper, “Fundamentals of Underwriting in the Nongroup 
Health Insurance Market: Access to Coverage and Options for Re-
form”; available at www.nhpf.org/library/background-papers/BP_Under-
writing_04-13-05.pdf.)
Most proposals for an exchange would require participating insur-
ers to accept every applicant in the target population and would 
limit the insurer’s ability to vary premium rates according to health 
risk. These provisions are hardly avoidable, given that a fundamen-
tal rationale for an exchange is to make insurance available to peo-
ple who are having trouble finding it. However, requiring exchange 
plans to operate under these restrictions would place them at a huge 
disadvantage if non-exchange plans could continue to operate under 
current state rules. They could refuse high-risk applicants and offer 
better rates than the exchange plans for low-risk ones. In time, the 
exchange could fall into a “death spiral,” serving a dwindling pool 
of high-risk enrollees with very high premium rates. 
Many proposals would avoid this problem by requiring non-exchange 
plans to conform to the same rules that govern plans within the ex-
change. If the exchange plans were required to guarantee issue and 
faced strict limits on rate variation, so would the non-exchange plans. 
Although this would largely solve the selection concern, the rules 
that might be applied to nongroup insurers are still being debated. 
The insurance industry, for example, contends that guaranteed issue 
would be workable only if it were accompanied by an individual 
mandate to buy coverage, an issue on which a consensus has not yet 
been reached. For this reason, it may be worth examining other ap-
proaches to the problem of selection in an unregulated market.
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Allow exchange plans to adopt some restrictions — At a minimum, the 
plans could be made available only during a limited annual open 
enrollment period. This restriction would prevent people from wait-
ing until they were sick to seek coverage. (An individual mandate, a 
requirement that every person obtain insurance, would also prevent 
this delay but would not protect the exchange from drawing a dis-
proportionate number of costly applicants.) The plans could also be 
allowed to adopt preexisting condition exclusions or to vary rates 
to some limited extent by health risk. In effect, the exchange would 
protect itself by mimicking the existing market, at the price of de-
feating one of its own main objectives. Many of the state-level HIPCs 
for small employers eventually found themselves forced to take this 
route. The Cleveland COSE, which serves both small firms with two 
or more employees and self-employed “groups of one,” follows the 
state’s small-group rules for the two-or-more class but follows the 
individual market rules for the groups of one, using underwriting 
to screen out high-risk applicants. An intermediate option would be 
to allow plans to start out operating under the current rules in their 
area and then gradually transition toward open enrollment and 
more uniform rating. This might allow exchange plans to develop a 
base of healthy enrollees and hope to retain them (perhaps simply by 
inertia) as a mix of sicker enrollees began to join.
Allow subsidies to be used only for exchange coverage — Some propos-
als would allow a tax credit or other subsidy to be applied only to 
premiums for a plan within the exchange.23 This is the model for the 
CommCare segment of the Massachusetts Connector. By reducing 
premiums for exchange plans, a restrictive subsidy could offset the 
price effects of adverse selection and help the plans compete with 
non-exchange coverage. Of course, this option would be unappeal-
ing to non-exchange carriers. Moreover, it could undercut the claim, 
in many exchange proposals, that everyone would be free to keep 
his or her existing coverage.
Require non-exchange insurers to compensate exchange plans for accepting 
excess risk — Aside from any premium subsidy, funds could be chan-
neled to exchange plans in several ways to help compensate them 
for accepting high-risk applicants. One might follow the approach 
used in some states to fund their high-risk pools for the medically 
uninsurable: non-exchange insurers who turned away sick appli-
cants could be assessed to help cover the costs of including these 
applicants in an exchange plan. A more elaborate system would be 
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to adopt a risk-adjustment scheme that shifted revenues among both 
exchange and non-exchange plans, based on some measure of the 
health status or expected need of their enrolled populations.
Any of these options involves striking a difficult balance between 
helping the exchange plans compete with the non-exchange market 
and giving them so great an advantage that non-exchange carriers 
might disappear from the target market segment. This basic issue is 
considered at the conclusion of this paper.
Insurer Par ticipation
An exchange would need to attract enough insurers to offer partici-
pants a meaningful choice among plans. If it succeeded in this goal, 
it might face the reverse problem: too many plans seeking entry. A 
proliferation of options could be confusing to consumers, complicate 
exchange administration, and reduce opportunities to leverage plan 
purchasing power and economies of scale.
Assuring an adequate choice of plans — At a minimum, an exchange 
would need to address the potential for adverse selection. Even so, 
some insurers might be hesitant to participate, because they would 
be entering a new market presenting uncertain risks. One solution 
might be some form of transitional risk-sharing. Under the Massa-
chusetts CommCare program, the Connector shares half the losses if 
a plan’s costs are more than 5 percent above its premium revenues; 
the Connector shares in profits if the plan’s costs are less than 95 
percent of revenues. (The Medicare Part D prescription drug pro-
gram has a similar risk-sharing arrangement.) Only one of the four 
plans had losses large enough to trigger the risk-sharing in 2007.24 
CommCare also has an individual stop-loss system; plans pay 1.25 
percent of premiums into a pool and are compensated when costs 
for any individual member exceed $150,000.
Even if plans’ concerns about financial risk were addressed, some 
observers contend that plans already operating in the small-group 
or individual market might have little incentive to offer coverage 
through an exchange. Why would insurers help an exchange meet 
its enrollment goals if the result would be to give the exchange 
greater bargaining power? In addition, insurers might not necessar-
ily prefer head-to-head price competition on a standardized bene-
fit.25 Insurers’ calculations about the benefits of joining an exchange 
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might differ if the exchange had a captive population that could 
not be reached in any other way or if the exchange were a widely 
publicized component of a comprehensive health reform program, 
as was the case in Massachusetts.
If an exchange sought to serve a broad area, such as a whole region or 
even the entire nation, it would face the further problem of assuring 
adequate choice in rural or other underserved areas. (Even in Mas-
sachusetts, only two of the six CommChoice insurers are available 
statewide.) Although the FEHBP makes multiple 
choices available throughout the country, it can 
do so only because of the nationwide Blue Cross 
Blue Shield and employee association PPOs. In 
2008, eight states had only one HMO competing 
with the PPO plans, and one state (Wyoming) 
had no HMO at all.26 Participants everywhere do 
have a choice among at least Blue Cross and the 
four national association plans, some of which 
have different optional benefit levels. However, because all these 
plans are PPOs that impose penalties for use of out-of-network care, 
this choice may not be meaningful in a given geographic area unless 
all of the available plans have adequate provider networks there. As 
might be expected, Blue Cross has the most comprehensive network. 
The other national plans develop their own networks or contract 
with existing networks (for example, CIGNA). Especially in isolated 
areas, the number and accessibility of participating providers can 
vary considerably among plans.
Some proposals would include a publicly administered health plan as 
one of the options available under the exchange. (In some proposals 
that include both concepts, it is unclear whether the proposed pub-
lic plan would operate within or in competition with the exchange.) 
A full discussion of the public plan option, which has emerged as 
one of the most contentious issues in the health reform debate, is be-
yond the scope of this paper. One concern is that including a public 
plan would discourage participation by private plans—which must, 
however efficient they are, make some profit—and that the exchange 
could then devolve into a public program. But some people contend 
that a public alternative could serve as a useful benchmark to en-
courage greater efficiencies by private carriers.27
Limiting participation — If an exchange were the principal avenue to 
coverage for a substantial population, it might wish to limit the 
If an exchange sought to serve a broad area, such 
as a whole region or even the entire nation, it 
would face the problem of assuring adequate 
choice in rural or other underserved areas.
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number of participating carriers. The FEHBP, while it is open to any 
HMO that wishes to participate and meets specified standards, is 
closed to any new PPO plan; only Blue Cross and the employee as-
sociations may offer these plans. At the other extreme, Medicare Ad-
vantage must contract with any new entrant that meets regulatory 
requirements. As a result, beneficiaries in Miami were expected to 
choose from among 107 different health plan options offered by 35 
different contractors as of May 2009.
A middle option is to allow the exchange to select plans through 
some form of competitive bidding or negotiation. CalPERS has in the 
past dropped plans that failed to hold their premium increases to 
target levels.28 The Massachusetts CommChoice 
program issued a request for proposals for its 
initial year of coverage; ten carriers respond-
ed, and six were approved, using an elaborate 
scoring system to grade the proposals. Criteria 
included premium and cost-sharing levels; de-
sired “features,” such as wellness programs or 
a high-performance network; marketing strategy; and broad geo-
graphic coverage.29 A system of this kind may necessarily involve 
some degree of subjective evaluation by exchange staff. This sub-
jectivity might be more acceptable for a program like CommChoice, 
which serves a very small market segment, than it would be for an 
exchange expected to serve a large population. A larger program 
might be obliged to develop a more rigid system, using only cost 
or other objective measures, possibly at the price of discouraging 
innovation and accelerating the current trend toward consolidation 
in the health insurance industry. (Paradoxically, a decision by the 
exchange to limit the number of competing plans could give each of 
the plans greater negotiating power.)
Benefit  Packages
An exchange could allow participating insurers to offer any benefit 
package they chose. It could set some minimum benefit standards but 
allow insurers to offer more comprehensive plans, or it could require 
all insurers to offer the same standardized plan. (An alternative to 
full standardization would be to allow insurers to offer “actuarially 
equivalent” benefits, that is, different benefit packages shown to be of 
equal value to a typical member of the target population.)
If an exchange were the principal avenue to 
coverage for a substantial population, it might 
wish to limit the number of participating carriers.
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The FEHBP is at one extreme, with no prescribed minimum ben-
efit package.30 OPM from time to time specifies particular benefit 
changes it wants from all plans, for example, mental health parity 
or added preventive services. It also has a strong review process 
for benefit proposals and has moved, since the 1980s, to eliminate 
a few plans with substandard coverage and to narrow differences 
among the remaining plans. Still, plans develop their own benefit 
packages; they may impose different levels of cost-
sharing, have different annual out-of-pocket limits, 
and differ in the extent of their coverage of ancillary 
services such as prescription drugs and dental and 
vision care. This amount of variation may make it 
difficult for participants to compare plan values. In 
addition, it has been alleged in the past that some 
plans manipulated their benefits to attract low-risk enrollees or dis-
courage high-risk enrollees. Similar opportunities might exist in an 
exchange if benefits were not standardized.
The Medicare Advantage program has a specified minimum, the 
benefits under original Medicare, but allows plans to design their 
own supplemental benefits. These benefits must have a minimum ac-
tuarial value (set for each plan as part of the bidding and rate-setting 
process), and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
may reject benefit designs likely to result in risk selection. Still, the 
benefit choices can be very complex, especially in areas served by a 
large number of plans.
The Massachusetts Connector offers three different levels of benefits; 
within a given level, competing plans have different specific features 
but roughly the same actuarial value. Similarly, President Clinton’s 
1993 health care proposal would have had a standardized benefit 
package to be offered by all insurers participating in the proposed 
health alliances; consumers would have been allowed to select from 
among three different possible levels of cost sharing. However, in-
surers would also have been permitted to offer separate supplemen-
tal plans, covering excluded services such as cosmetic surgery or 
paying some of the enrollees’ cost sharing, so long as the plans were 
offered uniformly to all enrollees in the basic coverage. 
Whatever the basic benefit standard (or set of standards), there is 
also the question of whether carriers could offer more comprehen-
sive plans. In the classic managed competition model, all insurers of-
fer the same package. This approach allows consumers to make easy 
It has been alleged in the past that some plans 
manipulated their benefits to attract low-risk 
enrollees or discourage high-risk enrollees.
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price comparisons, without having to guess about how well different 
plans would protect them under different possible scenarios of their 
future needs. It also reduces the likelihood that healthier people will 
be attracted to certain plans, for example, because they are willing to 
accept a higher deductible than people with greater expected costs. 
On the other hand, many proponents of competition among insurers 
believe that people should have the option of picking the package 
that best suits their own needs and preferences. One option is to re-
quire plans to quote a premium for the basic coverage and a separate 
premium for any additional benefits, the approach proposed in the 
1993 Clinton plan.31 Some people have suggested that a considerable 
number of different plans might be acceptable, so long as variation 
was on a limited number of clear parameters (such as deductible and 
percentage rate for coinsurance) and the plans had no “fine print” 
differences consumers would have difficulty in evaluating.32
Finally, as in the case of guaranteed issue and rating restrictions, 
there is the question of whether plans operating outside the ex-
change should be subject to the same benefit rules as exchange 
plans. If not, the possibility exists that non-exchange plans would 
offer benefit packages designed to appeal to healthier applicants. Al-
though uniform benefit requirements could prevent this tactic, some 
people would object to this further restriction on consumer choice.
Risk Adjustment
In addition to the general problem of exchange plans attracting high-
risk applicants is the likelihood that plans within the exchange will 
have different risk profiles. Price competition among plans can be 
distorted if healthier or lower-cost participants are in some plans 
and sicker, higher-cost participants are in others. Plan premium dif-
ferences may then reflect, not the plans’ relative efficiency, but rather 
the characteristics of their enrolled populations.
The problem of “biased selection” has arisen in both public and pri-
vate arrangements that offer a choice among health plans. Several 
studies of the FEHBP in the 1980s, including one by the Congressional 
Research Service, found evidence of selection problems and conse-
quent distortions of premium competition.33 Some more recent stud-
ies found little evidence of biased selection among active workers.34 
At a minimum, however, it is clear that the FEHBP practice of using a 
uniform premium for active workers and annuitants makes the plans 
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with a higher proportion of annuitants more costly than other plans, 
regardless of relative efficiency.
Medicare has had a similar problem. Enrollees in Medicare Advan-
tage plans are healthier than beneficiaries remaining in original 
Medicare; within the MA program, those choosing private fee-for-
service plans are healthier than those choosing HMOs.35 Medicare 
has responded by using a risk-adjustment system. Enrollee charac-
teristics that may predict future costs and utilization are compared 
across plans, and the program then pays the plans with low-risk 
populations less than those with high-risk 
populations. The adjustments are invisible to 
consumers: the rates they see when making 
plan choices are rates for a “typical” partici-
pant. This minimizes the need for plans with 
high-risk populations to charge higher premi-
ums. Medicaid managed care programs and 
a few employer group purchasing programs, 
such as the California HIPC and Minnesota’s 
Buyers Health Care Action Group, have also adopted some form of 
risk adjustment.
Some risk-adjustment systems are fairly primitive; for example, they 
may use only the age and sex of enrollees, although there can be con-
siderable cost variation within an age or sex class. More sophisticated 
systems, like the one developed for Medicare Advantage plans, use 
data on enrollees’ past diagnoses or conditions and/or their utiliza-
tion of specific services, such as prescription drugs. Because people’s 
conditions and need for services change over time, none of these sys-
tems can perfectly measure the level of risk presented by different 
plans’ populations. They may serve their purpose if they discourage 
plans from seeking to enroll low-risk populations (for example, by 
manipulating their benefit packages or using targeted marketing) 
and if they work well enough to prevent ongoing major distortions 
in pricing.
The more complex systems use extensive patient-specific information, 
accepting the trade-off between precision and the cost of collecting 
data. In addition to the added cost, a system requiring data on past di-
agnoses and utilization would not be workable in the early years of a 
new exchange—and might never be workable if participants tended to 
shift in and out of the exchange system. It is possible to develop retro-
spective risk adjustment, under which data on enrollees are collected 
The more complex risk-adjustment systems use 
extensive patient-specific information, accepting 
the trade-off between precision and the cost of 
collecting data.
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during each year and the plans are compensated at the end of the year 
if they turn out to have enrolled a high-risk population. However, this 
approach could make it very difficult for carriers to make financial 
plans and might limit exchange participation to those with more sub-
stantial capital reserves.
If exchange plans were in competition with plans operating outside 
the exchange, it might seem logical to extend risk adjustment to all 
plans in or out of the exchange that served a given population. This 
would require that all plans supply data. In addition, some degree of 
benefit standardization would be needed, because it would be diffi-
cult to design a risk-adjustment system for plans with different benefit 
packages. Once non-exchange plans had been subjected to the degree 
of regulation needed to make risk adjustment work, it is not clear 
why they would find it beneficial to remain outside the exchange.
Geographic Scope
The various prototypes for an exchange have operated in a single 
metropolitan area (Cleveland’s COSE), across an entire state (the 
Massachusetts Connector and CalPERS), and nationally (FEHBP). 
Most current discussion focuses on either a state-level or national 
exchange. Each has possible advantages. State-level exchanges might 
be better equipped to deal with local differences in the health insur-
ance marketplace or health delivery systems. A national exchange 
might benefit from some economies of scale and could also have 
greater bargaining power. In addition, it might promote greater con-
tinuity of coverage, because people who moved to a new state would 
not have to change exchanges (although they might have to change 
insurance plans within the exchange.)
A national exchange would need to address at least two major issues. 
The first relates to benefits. Every state has laws requiring health in-
surers to cover specific types of health services (for example, mental 
health care or contraceptives), to pay for services rendered by specific 
providers (such as chiropractors), and/or to include certain individu-
als (such as adopted children) in family coverage. These laws apply 
only to policies sold by licensed insurers. (Employers who choose to 
self insure—that is, to cover their workers’ expenses directly, instead 
of buying an insurance policy—are exempt from state mandates un-
der the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, or ERISA).
JUNE 5, 2009 NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FORUM 
20
If insurers participating in a national exchange were required to 
comply with state mandates, the exchange would not be able to 
establish a uniform benefit package, and administration would 
be complicated. To avoid this problem, the authorizing law for the 
 FEHBP exempts contracts for coverage of federal employees from 
state benefit rules.36 A law authorizing a national exchange could 
create a similar exemption, subjecting participating insurers only 
to whatever benefit requirements were adopted by the exchange. 
However, state mandates often are enacted in response to pressure 
from provider organization or patient advocacy groups. Preemption 
might merely shift the locus of lobbying efforts from state legisla-
tures to the exchange administrators or to Congress.
A second key issue for a national exchange would be pricing. What 
is the fairest way of accounting for regional variations in health 
spending? Under the FEHBP, the national plans charge one rate na-
tionwide, while the HMOs charge rates that reflect local prices. The 
Blue Cross standard plan is more expensive than the three HMOs 
available in Atlanta; it is less expensive than any HMO available 
in New Jersey. In the FEHBP context, the potential for distortion in 
competition is reduced because enrollees receive a government con-
tribution: the differences in the net premiums paid by enrollees for 
different plans are not as large as the gross premium differences. 
The same might be true for exchange participants receiving some 
form of premium subsidy. But participants with incomes too high 
for the subsidy would see the full premium difference. Moreover, 
the potential distortion in competition among plans within an ex-
change could be exacerbated if the exchange plans were competing 
with non-exchange plans that were all locally priced. CalPERS faced 
this problem, because local governments could buy coverage either 
through the program or in the outside market. Statewide CalPERS 
premiums were uncompetitive in southern California, and the pro-
gram was forced to adopt regional pricing.
Similarly, a national exchange could allow all plans, whether nation-
al or local, to set prices locally. While this might seem fairer, it could 
also create a hardship for people in high-cost areas who were eligible 
for a low-income premium subsidy. The subsidy might be enough to 
buy generous coverage in some areas and not others. One solution, 
adopted under the low-income subsidy component of the Medicare 
Part D prescription drug program, is to provide different maximum 
subsidies in different areas, based on local premium levels. 
A national exchange could allow 
all plans, whether national or 
local, to set prices locally.
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Governance
An exchange could be a government agency, an entirely independent 
private organization, or some form of mixed public-private entity. At 
one extreme, the FEHBP is operated by an ordinary executive branch 
agency, the OPM. Other exchange-like programs, such as Cleveland’s 
COSE and the Connecticut CBIA program, are wholly private. Some 
HIPCs are private but operate under special state authorization leg-
islation that may waive some rules, such as mandated benefit laws, 
or may allow insurers to contract with a small-employer exchange 
on terms different from those they offer to other small groups. These 
laws may create one exchange or allow for multi-
ple competing exchanges; in Texas, for example, 
57 group purchasing cooperatives and coalitions 
were certified by the state as of March 2008.37
Other exchanges or similar programs fall some-
where between public and private status. In 
Massachusetts, the Connector Authority is an “independent public 
entity” with a ten-member board, of whom four are state officials 
and the rest are appointed by the governor or attorney general.38 The 
CalPERS Board has a similar mix of public officials and appointed 
members, plus some members who are elected by CalPERS enroll-
ees.39 A mixed public-private authority can be structured in many 
ways. At the federal level are boards and administrations with vary-
ing degrees of autonomy from executive oversight, government cor-
porations such as Amtrak, and government-sponsored enterprises 
such as the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. 
There is no firm typology of government organizations, nor can they 
be arranged along a single continuum with poles labeled public and 
private. Instead, organizations vary along multiple dimensions of 
flexibility or autonomy, each potentially important in the design of 
an exchange. A number of questions could be asked in order to ex-
plore these dimensions:
• Does an organization have to comply with general rules for gov-
ernment agencies, such as civil service laws or standard procurement 
procedures? 
Some people would suggest that personnel rules could prevent an ex-
change from rapidly building a skilled staff, while strict contracting 
procedures might limit its ability to negotiate with insurers. How-
ever valid these concerns, it is common for government agencies to 
An exchange could be a government agency, an 
entirely independent private organization, or some 
form of mixed public-private entity. 
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be exempted from specific requirements. For example, various advi-
sory bodies are subject to neither civil service nor procurement rules. 
Specific rules aside, one important difference between a public and 
private exchange might be that a public program would have to pro-
vide some degree of due process. A private exchange might admit or 
exclude health insurers more or less arbitrarily, while a public one 
must have uniform requirements applied objectively.
• To what extent is an organization subject to executive review or fed-
eral oversight? 
Some of the functions that might be performed by an exchange, 
such as processing enrollment applications and collecting premi-
ums, are more or less mechanical. Others might involve a greater 
degree of subjective judgment. An exchange might be called upon 
to specify a minimum benefit package. It might have to approve 
a risk-adjustment system that would redistribute revenues among 
insurers. In Massachusetts, the Connector decides how much fami-
lies at different income levels can afford to pay for health insurance. 
(This decision in turn determines which families will be subject to 
the individual coverage mandate.) 
It might be argued that an exchange would be better able to make 
difficult and potentially controversial decisions if it were indepen-
dent and shielded as much as possible from the political process. An-
other possible viewpoint is that decisions of this kind, involving as 
they often do the distribution of financial burdens and rewards, are 
inherently political. Whether an exchange is public or private, it is 
going to have to find some way of balancing the competing interests 
of consumers, insurers, providers, and (if public premium subsidies 
are involved) taxpayers.
• Must an organization seek annual appropriations, or does it have its 
own dedicated funding stream?
Prototypes for an exchange, whether public or private, commonly 
meet their operating costs through an assessment on premiums. This 
is the case for both semi-independent organizations like the Mas-
sachusetts Connector and for government agencies like OPM and 
to some extent CMS, which funds beneficiary education programs 
through health plan user fees. An organization with dedicated fund-
ing may be less subject to detailed legislative oversight; a possible 
trade-off for this independence is that elected officials would be less 
engaged and less committed to the organization’s success.
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CONCLUSION
Many of the design issues that would need to be resolved in devel-
oping a health insurance exchange revolve around a central ques-
tion: how would the exchange fit into the existing health insurance 
marketplace? In the 1993 Clinton plan, the local health alliances were 
intended to be the basic gateway to coverage for nearly all individu-
als and small-employer groups. Only larger-employer plans were to 
be allowed to operate outside the alliance structure. This was one 
of the basic reasons for the vehement opposition to the plan by the 
private insurance industry. Although some larger insurers that were 
already deeply invested in managed care believed that they could 
function within the proposed system, smaller insurers whose prof-
its depended on skillful selection of healthy applicants would have 
been forced out of business.
Most of the current proposals instead contemplate an exchange that 
would compete side-by-side with non-exchange insurers. These in-
surers would be selling coverage to the same population, individual 
and/or small-group, targeted by the exchange. As was suggested 
earlier, if non-exchange insurers continued to offer coverage at favor-
able rates to the healthiest applicants (or manipulated benefit pack-
ages to attract these applicants), the exchange could degenerate into a 
high-risk pool, dependent on government subsidies to serve a small 
population of older and sicker clients. On the other hand, measures 
that might help protect the exchange by restricting the activities of 
non-exchange insurers could make it very difficult for those insurers 
to compete in the same market. Perhaps some could operate more 
efficiently or offer higher quality than the exchange plans, although 
there are also concerns that some would continue to find ways of at-
tracting healthier enrollees.
What would it mean if an exchange were to wind up as the only 
game in town for the segment of the population it served? The basic 
premise of an exchange, that structured competition among insur-
ance carriers can reduce costs, may require that the exchange con-
tract with a limited number of carriers, so that each can have a large 
enough enrollment and sufficient market power to bring changes in 
the way health care is delivered and organized. 
Provider groups would likely be concerned if an exchange were to 
accelerate the trend toward concentration in the insurance industry, 
strengthening a few insurers’ bargaining power. On the other hand, 
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some people think that further consolidation might be desirable, if it 
reduced duplicative administrative systems and enhanced insurers’ 
ability to pursue initiatives such as pay-for-performance or bundled 
payment systems, care coordination and wellness programs, large 
investments in health information technology, and development of 
integrated systems. Others suggest that an exchange could actually 
reduce consolidation, for example, by making it possible for new, 
community-based plans to compete on a more equal footing with 
established insurers.
An exchange serving a large share of the nonelderly population 
could emerge as a force for driving fundamental change in the way 
insurers operate and, in turn, the way health care is organized and 
delivered. If this occurs, however, it will be necessary to develop a 
governance structure that can maintain the flexibility to innovate 
while assuring accountability to the providers, insurers, and con-
sumers the exchange would need to serve.
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